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Steckman and Johnson: An Unresolved Question

WHEN MAY A LITIGANT RELY IN ITS OWN COMPLAINT
ON ALLEGATIONS FROM ANOTHER COMPLAINT?—
LIPSKY V. COMMONWEALTH UNITED CORP. AND ITS
PROGENY – STILL AN UNRESOLVED QUESTION
Laurence A. Steckman, Esq. *
Joseph T. Johnson, Esq. **

INTRODUCTION
Since the Second Circuit decided Lipsky v. Commonwealth
United Corp. 1 in 1976, district courts within the Second Circuit have
differed regarding the extent to which a plaintiff, in making its own
allegations, may refer to or rely on the allegations contained within a
complaint filed by someone else. Some courts interpret Lipsky as articulating a bright line rule that precludes any reliance on other pleadings, on the theory that someone else’s allegations are just that, unproven assertions that have not been tested and factually confirmed,
and thus, cannot support another’s pleading. Others have interpreted
Lipsky as not precluding such reliance, at least in some circumstanc*
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es. Still others have stated views regarding their interpretation of
Lipsky, but resolved the cases before them under Rule 11. Recently,
several courts, though mentioning Rule 11 and/or Lipsky, seem to be
applying a standard rooted in the court’s assessment of the apparent
“plausibility” of the information in the foreign pleading’s text. The
cases are very much in conflict.
Part I discusses Lipsky, its assumptions and cases interpreting
it as articulating a bright line test, precluding reference to or use of
pleading content from other cases as the basis for one’s own pleading. Part II discusses cases rejecting the bright line interpretation,
and holding that Lipsky does not preclude reference to other pleadings, at least in some circumstances. Part III discusses cases that
adopt an approach relying on Rule 11 and the concept of “reasonable
investigation.” Part III also discusses cases employing what amounts
to a “plausibility” approach, in which the reviewing court tries to discern the likelihood that the allegations of a pleading in a different
case are sufficiently “factual” to justify a pleader’s reliance upon
them in its own complaint. The authors conclude that, on balance,
the majority, bright-line interpretation of Lipsky is the best among
competing interpretive approaches.
I.

LIPSKY’S ASSUMPTIONS AND THE BRIGHT LINE RULE CASES
A.

Lipsky and the Basis for its Ruling

The Second Circuit, in Lipsky, addressed whether a plaintiff
could rely in his complaint on a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) complaint. 2 Bobby Darin’s (a/k/a Walden Cassotto)
Estate brought a claim for rescission of a stock purchase agreement
based on material breach, contending that Commonwealth United
Corporation ( “CUC”) failed to use its best efforts to cause its registration statement to become effective for shares it sold to Darin. 3 The
Estate’s complaint referenced paragraphs from (and attached) the
SEC’s civil complaint against CUC objecting to CUC’s registration
statement for other stock based on allegedly material omissions and

2
3

Id. at 891.
Id. at 890.
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misleading statements. 4 The SEC complaint had resulted in a consent
judgment. 5 The plaintiff did not “dispute that the consent judgment,
itself, or that the SEC complaint was inadmissible,” but it defended
the materiality of those allegations to its pleading on the ground that
the SEC’s position on CUC’s statements was relevant to whether
CUC used its “best efforts” to register Darin’s stock. 6 CUC contended the consent judgment was inadmissible and, therefore, a fortiori,
the SEC complaint was immaterial. 7 The district court struck those
allegations from the Estate’s complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(f),
without opinion.8
Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike from a pleading any
immaterial matter. However, “[i]n deciding whether to strike a Rule
12(f) motion on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial, it is settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown
that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible.” 9
The Second Circuit held that although the SEC complaint resulted in
a consent judgment, that judgment was not the result of an actual adjudication of any of the issues and, therefore, could not be evidence
in the litigation at bar. 10 The Court saw no relevant distinction, for
Rule 12(f) purposes, between the SEC consent judgment, which was
inadmissible (expressing the view that it could have “no possible
bearing on the Darin action”), and the SEC complaint, which preceded the consent judgment. 11
For that reason, Lipsky held the SEC complaint could not be

4

Id. at 890-91.
Id. at 892.
6 Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893.
7 Id. at 893.
8 Id. at 892-93.
9 Id. at 893.
10 Id. at 893-94. The Lipsky court made clear that it viewed the issues in the case as evidentiary, stating as part of the preface to its analysis:
Evidentiary questions, such as the one present in this case, should
especially be avoided at such a preliminary stage of the proceedings.
Usually the questions of relevancy and admissibility in general require
the context of an ongoing and unfolding trial in which to be properly decided. And ordinarily neither a district court nor an appellate court
should decide to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that the
material could not possibly be relevant on the sterile field of the pleadings alone.
Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94.
11 Id. at 894
5
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properly cited or referenced in the pleading before the district court. 12
The Second Circuit held:
This is a consent judgment between a federal
agency and a private corporation[,] which is not the
result of an actual adjudication of any of the issues.
Consequently, it can not [sic] be used as evidence in
subsequent litigation between that corporation and another party. Fed. Rules Evid., Rule 410, 28 U.S.C.A.,
prohibits a plea of nolo contendere from being later
used against the party who so pleaded. . . . The reason
for this equivalence is that both consent decrees and
pleas of nolo contendere are not true adjudications of
the underlying issues; a prior judgment can only be introduced in a later trial for collateral estoppel purposes
if the issues sought to be precluded were actually adjudicated in the prior trial. . . . The consent decree entered into by the SEC and CUC was the result of private bargaining, and there was no hearing or rulings
or any form of decision on the merits by the district
court.
Since it is clear that the SEC-CUC consent
judgment, itself, can have no possible bearing on the
Darin action, the SEC complaint which preceded the
consent judgment is also immaterial, for the purposes
of Rule 12(f).
We agree that the SEC’s opinion on the sufficiency of the various statements may be relevant and
may be admissible. But we do not agree that it necessarily follows that its complaint is appropriately within
the pleadings. 13
Because Darin’s estate was making allegations unnecessary to
its pleading of its claim for rescission due to breach, the Second Circuit concluded its allegations were inadmissible. Faced with an appeal from an order striking the allegations (without decision), and
failing to see “how Darin is harmed by the elimination of the SEC

12
13

Id.
Id. at 893-94 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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references,” 14 it affirmed the order. Although the Lipsky Court explained that the SEC complaint might be relevant to the question
whether CUC used best efforts, “neither a complaint nor references to
a complaint which results in a consent judgment may properly be cited in the pleadings under the facts of this case.” 15
B.

Lipsky and Cases Following a Bright Line Rule

Since Lipsky, a majority of cases within the Second Circuit
have held that where a complaint’s allegations are either based on or
rely upon complaints in other actions that have been dismissed or settled or are otherwise not resolved, they must be immaterial under
Rule 12(f).
In In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec.
Litig., 16 for example, allegations in a class action securities complaint
were stricken because they referred to or relied upon, inter alia, unresolved SEC complaints against the same parties. The court dismissed
the complaint with leave to replead, cautioning the plaintiffs not to
include such allegations, stating Second Circuit law was clear “that
references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceedings that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or legal
or permissible findings of fact are, as a matter of law, immaterial under Rule 12(f).” 17 In support of its holding, the court cited, among
other cases, Lipsky, 18 U.S. v. Gilbert, 19 and Brotman v. Nat’l Life Ins.

14

Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94.
Id. at 893.
16 218 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
17 Id. at 78.
18 Id. (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 892–94) (observing that Lipsky had likened a consent decree between defendants and the SEC in a separate action to a plea of nolo contendere, and
citing Fed. R. Evid. 410, which declares nolo pleas inadmissible, to hold that the consent decree and the SEC complaint which preceded it were both immaterial under Rule 12(f) and
could not be used to prove liability).
19 Id. at 78-79 (citing Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981) and observing that Gilbert
had reasoned:
[T]hat a consent decree was more appropriately likened to the settlement
of a civil suit than to a nolo contendere plea, so the governing Rule of
Evidence was 408, not 410, but preserving Lipsky’ s holding that if an
SEC complaint did not result or has not yet resulted in an adjudication
on the merits, a plaintiff may not cite the complaint to prove underlying
facts of liability.)
Merrill Lynch, 218 F.R.D. 78-79.
15
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Co. 20 The court continued:
Similarly, references to an Attorney General’s conclusory report following a preliminary investigation in a
case that never was presented for nor reached an adjudication upon the merits, are also immaterial under
Rule 12(f). See Ledford v. Rapid–American Corp.,
No. 86 Civ. 9116, 1988 WL 3428, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 8, 1988) (Keenan, J.) (relying on Lipsky and striking allegations in a complaint that referred to an investigation and report by the New York State Division of
Human Rights which was a non-adjudicative step in
the administrative proceeding where there had been no
findings of fact); Shahzad v. H.J. Meyers & Co., Inc.,
No. 95 Civ. 6196(DAB), 1997 WL 47817, at *13–14
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (Batts, J.) (striking the affidavit of an SEC investigator filed in a separate action as
unrelated and serving no purpose in the present case
other than to inflame the reader).
. . . [T]he allegations of the present Amended
Complaint contained in paragraphs . . . that refer to or
rely on the SEC’s complaints against Merrill Lynch
and Henry Blodget, on the NASD’s complaint against
Phua Young, on the 309 complaints in the ongoing
IPO Securities Litigation, on the complaint and appendices in the ongoing IPO Antitrust Litigation, and
on the Dinallo Affidavit are hereby stricken under
Rule 12(f) and may not be included in any amended
pleadings hereafter. 21
In RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 22 the court held that the reference to the two complaints setting forth claims not resolved on the
merits was improper. 23 RSM quoted Merrill Lynch in striking the
complaints as immaterial, as a matter of law, 24 dismissing the plead20 Id. at 79 (citing Bratmen v. Nat’l Life Ins. Comp., No. 94 CV 3468, 1999 WL 33109 at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1999) and observing that Bratmen had reconciled holdings in Lipsky
and Gilbert).
21 Id.
22 643 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
23 Id. at 403-04.
24 Id. at 404.
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ing with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action:
TNK–BP’s request that the court strike those exhibits
that reference two complaints filed in actions that have
not been resolved on the merits, as well as the paragraphs in the Third Amended Complaint based on
those exhibits, is granted because neither complaint
resulted in an adjudication on the merits or “legally
permissible findings of fact.” . . . That request is
granted because Exhibits B and C are copies of complaints filed in actions that were never resolved on the
merits and, thus, did not result in any findings of law
or fact. Second Circuit case law is clear that paragraphs in a complaint that are either based on, or rely
on, complaints in other actions that have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a
matter of law, immaterial within the meaning of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(f). 25
As to the two complaints from other actions, which the plaintiff had attached as exhibits to its own amended pleading: one was
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the other was
discontinued via stipulation. They were deemed “preliminary steps
in litigations . . . that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or
legal permissible findings of fact.” 26 The RSM court held both complaints immaterial, as a matter of law, citing Merrill Lynch, and
struck the other complaints as well as paragraphs in the complaint before the court relying solely on the stricken complaints. 27
In Platinum and Palladium Commodities Litig.,28 the defend25

Id. at 403 (discussing Lipsky, the court explained:
In Lipsky, the court struck a consent decree between defendants and the
SEC, as well as the underlying complaint filed with the SEC, as immaterial. The court reasoned that, because the consent decree was the result
of a private bargain between the parties and was not a hearing or ruling
or any form of decision on the merits by the . . . court, . . . it could have
no possible bearing on the dispute before the court. For the same reasons, the complaint that preceded the consent judgment was stricken as
immaterial. More recently, this reasoning has been applied to strike all
paragraphs that referred to or relied on complaints in ongoing disputes.)
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
26 RSM Prod. Corp., 643 F. Supp. 2d at 404. RSM is often cited as a precedent.
27 Id. at 404.
28 828 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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ants moved to strike and dismiss the complaint that derived its allegations “wholesale” from an order of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), which instituted administrative proceedings,
made findings of fact, and imposed sanctions and a $25 million fine
against them. 29 The CFTC order was issued after the defendants had
submitted an offer of settlement, which the CFTC accepted. 30 The
court held the CFTC order, itself, was inadmissible 31 and that the
complaint allegations were a “model” of the kind of pleading Lipsky
prohibited, 32 and explained:
Although the CFTC Order included certain factual findings, it nevertheless was the product of a settlement between the CFTC and the Respondents, not
an adjudication of the underlying issues in the CFTC
proceeding. Plaintiffs are therefore prohibited from
29

Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.
31 Id. at 593. Observing that:
As courts in this Circuit have found repeatedly, Lipsky teaches that
references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceedings that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or legal or permissible findings of fact are, as a matter of law, immaterial under Rule
12(f) . . . . See Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349, 363 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (“[c]ourts hold that references in pleadings to agreements with
state or federal agencies may properly be stricken on a Rule 12(f) motion.”); Ledford v. Rapid–American Corp., No. 86 Civ. 9116(JFK), 1988
WL 3428, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1988) (“[r]eferences in a complaint to
proceedings which do not adjudicate underlying issues may be stricken."); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293,
336 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (The Second Circuit has clearly held that
consent judgments . . . are not the result of actual adjudications on the
merits and therefore cannot be used as evidence in subsequent litigation
between the parties.”)
Id. (citation omitted).
32 In re Platinum, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (observing that:
For example, Paragraph 81 alleges that the CFTC’s charges involved
what the CFTC found to be a manipulative scheme in NYMEX platinum
and palladium futures contracts traded in this District during the period
of at least November 2007 through May 2008 . . . . Similarly, Paragraph
83 asserts that [a]s the CFTC’s holding that the Moore Capital Defendants violated Section 9(a)(2) shows, in devising, entering or causing others to enter these ‘bang the close’ orders, Defendant Pia was, in fact, an
employee, agent and other person acting on behalf of each of the Moore
Defendants . . . . These allegations are paradigms of the type of pleading
prohibited by Lipsky and its progeny.)
Id. (citation omitted).
30
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relying on the CFTC Order to plead the “underlying
facts of liability.” United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d
94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981); see Footbridge Ltd. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4050(PKC), 2010
WL 3790810, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010)
(“[D]efendants’ motion to strike is granted with respect to the allegations . . . insofar as they are based
on pleadings, settlements, and government investigations in other cases.”); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 234
B.R. at 336 (striking references to an SEC consent order); Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ.
1533, 2008 WL 2483288, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 17,
2008) (striking references to a settlement with the
New York Attorney General). 33
The court held the plaintiffs were prohibited from relying on
the CFTC Order to plead the “underlying facts of liability” 34 and
dismissed their claims. 35
In a particularly clear statement of the absolute interpretation
of Lipsky, Judge Rakoff, in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Mkt. Inc., 36 set
forth the traditional justification for the bright line interpretation of
Lipsky:
As a matter of law, an allegation that is neither
admitted nor denied is simply that, an allegation. It
has no evidentiary value and no collateral estoppel effect. It is precisely for this reason that the Second Circuit held long ago . . . that a consent judgment between a federal agency and a private corporation,
33 Id. at 594. Plaintiffs argued that the CFTC Order was material to their claims because it
would be admissible at trial, but the court rejected the argument. The admissibility of “a civil consent decree” such as the CFTC Order, the court held, would be governed by Rule 408,
citing Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97, and that Rule 408 “bars evidence of a compromise to prove
liability for the claim, but specifically permits use of such evidence for other purposes.” Id.
In pleading the facts supporting their claims, Plaintiffs had quoted extensively from the
CFTC Order – “indicating an express purpose to employ the CFTC Order to prove liability.”
Id. The court further noted plaintiffs’ purpose to do so was “manifest in Plaintiffs’ argument
that the Court should accord deference to the CFTC’s findings of liability” under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34 Id. at 594 (quoting Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97).
35 Id. at 595. The court also struck from the Complaint terms such as “frequent” or “often” taken directly from the CFTC Order.
36 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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which is not the result of an actual adjudication of any
of the issues . . . can not [sic] be used as evidence in
subsequent litigation . . . . It follows that the allegations of the complaint that gives rise to the consent
judgment are not evidence of anything either. Indeed
the Lipsky court went so far as to hold that neither [an
S.E.C.] complaint nor reference to [such] a complaint
which results in a consent judgment may properly be
cited in the pleadings in a parallel private action and
must instead be stricken. 37
In re CRM Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig. 38 involved a securities
fraud complaint. The district court denied reconsideration of its decision dismissing the complaint with prejudice and excluding allegations relying on a New York State Workers’ Compensation Board letter and complaint and an Attorney General Notice as “unproven” and,
thus, having “no evidentiary bearing.” 39 CRM relied on Lipsky, RSM,
and Merrill Lynch. While the district court noted the existence of
contrary authority on this issue, it found such authority not binding
and Lipsky controlling:
Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to show that reconsideration
of the decision to exclude these materials is warranted.
As the Opinion explained, allegations of wrongdoing
contained in the WCB Letter, the NYAG Notice, and
the WCB complaint were excluded because the allegations therein were unproven and thus the allegations
had no evidentiary bearing on Plaintiffs’ case . . . . In
so doing, this Court relied on Lipsky . . . which upheld
a district court’s decision to strike portions of a com37
38
39

Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
No. 10 CIV 00975 (RPP), 2013 WL 787970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013).
Id. at *16, n. 15. Arguing:
The specific allegations of wrongdoing contained in the WCB letter and
paragraph 151 of the CAC are not recited here, as they are unproven allegations and thus have no evidentiary bearing in this proceeding. See
RSM, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at
892–94) (“Second Circuit case law is clear that paragraphs in a complaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other actions that
have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a matter
of law, immaterial within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).”).

Id.
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plaint that were based on allegations from a separate
legal action that had not been fully adjudicated . . . .
Plaintiffs claim that this reliance was improper because, after Lipsky, the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit have permitted plaintiffs to rely upon complaints filed in other actions to allege securities fraud .
...
Plaintiffs fail, however, to cite any controlling
authority overturning or vacating the Second Circuit’s
holding in Lipsky. Instead, Plaintiffs cite several district court cases for the proposition that neither Circuit
precedent nor logic supports an absolute rule that any
portion of a pleading that relies on unadjudicated allegations in another complaint is immaterial under Rule
12(f). 40
The court stated that the district court cases that had rejected
the absolute interpretation of Lipsky were not binding and that other
courts had:
[A]dopted a position in line with the decision advanced in the Opinion − that paragraphs in a complaint . . . based on, or rely on, complaints from other
actions dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved,
are, as a matter of law, immaterial within the meaning
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 41

40

Id. at *5-6. (citation omitted).
Id. at *6 (citing RSM and Merrill Lynch); see generally Waterford Twp. Police & Fire
Ret. Sys. v. Smithtown Bancorp, Inc., No. 10-CV-864 (SLT)(RER), 2014 WL 3569338, at
*3-4 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2014) (striking facts drawn from confidential witness statements
referenced in a separate state court complaint that was the result of a consent agreement that
was the product of a settlement with a federal agency, relying primarily on Lipsky, Merrill
Lynch, and In re Platinum & Palladium); Precimed v. ECA Med. Instrument, 2014 WL
1883584, at * 2 (W.D.N.Y. May 12, 2014), (striking allegations made in prior lawsuits,
which had no bearing on issues in the current matter, noting it was unlikely allegations
would be admissible at trial and would be prejudicial, and observing cases from which the
allegations taken were dismissed shortly after being filed without affirmative relief being
granted, citing Lipsky and RSM -- but denying motion to strike allegations from prior lawsuits referenced in counterclaim regarding financial condition and difficulties in business
area in issue on ground that they were relevant to allegations regarding breach of agreement
for financial and business reasons).
41
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II. LIPSKY AND THE NOT-SO-BRIGHT LINE RULE CASES
A separate line of cases rejects Lipsky as articulating a bright
line rule and concludes that, at least in some circumstances, other
pleadings may be cited and/or relied upon.
In SEC v. Lee, 42 for example, four complaints were filed by
the New York Mercantile Exchange (“NYMEX”), CFTC, SEC and
Bank of Montreal (“BMO”), respectively, arising from the same
fraudulent scheme employed by a trader and his supervisor at BMO
involving brokerages. The district court denied various defendants’
motions to dismiss the complaints and to strike those portions of
NYMEX’s complaint, which relied for some of its allegations on the
companion complaints of the SEC and the CFTC. 43
In denying the motion to strike, the court stated that there is
no absolute bar on (i) “relying on government pleadings or proceedings in order to meet” pleading standards, or (ii) using “information
contained in an SEC complaint as evidence to support” claims. 44 The
court had already satisfied itself as to the sufficiency of similar
claims pled in the other complaints and also found NYMEX was not
solely reliant on the other complaints inasmuch as the basis for some
of NYMEX’s allegations included direct dealings between it and the
defendants themselves. 45
Similarly, in In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 46 the district court permitted the class action plaintiffs in
a securities fraud action involving mortgage-backed securities to rely
on allegations set forth in other complaints, such as one summarizing
a study of loan documents and the breaches of representations contained therein. 47 The district court held that Lipsky does not support
an absolute rule barring such reliance. 48 In observing that “[n]ot all
complaints are created equal”, the court held that “[i]t makes little
sense to say that information from [] a study . . . is immaterial simply
because it is conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.” 49

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

720 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 341.
851 F. Supp. 2d 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 767-68 n.24.
Id.
Id.
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Notably, however, the court stated that the balance of the
complaint contained sufficient factual allegations to support the
claims regardless of whether it struck the borrowed allegations. 50
Defendants argued complaint sections relying on allegations from
other litigants’ complaints should be disregarded or stricken, under
Lipsky, but the court set forth a different understanding of Lipsky’s
rationale and ruling than the absolute interpretation cases:
The Circuit’s rationale was that the consent decree
was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 410; thus, the
plaintiff could not derive any evidentiary benefit from
the complaint that proceeded it. . . . The Circuit reiterated the strong presumption against striking portions
of the pleadings and cautioned that its holding was
limited to “the facts of this case.” . . . Nonetheless,
some courts in this district have stretched the holding
in Lipsky to mean that any portion of a pleading that
relies on unadjudicated allegations in another complaint is immaterial under Rule 12(f) . . . . Neither
Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute
50

Id.; see generally Brotman, 1999 WL 33109, at *2 (citing Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893-94).
Stating:
Plaintiff next argues that the consent orders are inadmissible because
they did not formally adjudicate any of the facts recited therein. See
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d at 893–94 (holding
that consent judgment may not be used for collateral estoppel purposes,
since the underlying issues have not been litigated and decided on the
merits); Halyalkar v. Bd. of Regents, 527 N.E.2d 1222, 1226–27 (N.Y.
1988) (admission of guilt pursuant to New Jersey consent order did not
collaterally estop physician from denying “knowing and willful misconduct” in subsequent New York proceeding). Here, however, the evidence would be offered not to prove the truth of the underlying factual
matters recited in the consent orders, but to show that Plaintiff may have
had an ulterior motive for filing a disability claim and to attack his credibility with respect to his professed reasons for seeking benefits. Such
use of negotiations or agreements to compromise a claim is permissible
under Rule 408 of the [Fed. R. Evid.] Rule 404(b), while barring the use
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, similarly permits the admission of such evidence to prove motive, intent, knowledge, and for other
purposes. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97 (2d Cir.
1981) (SEC civil consent decree admissible under Rule 404(b) in subsequent criminal trial regarding securities law violations to show defendant
knew of reporting requirements involved in the decree).
Id. (alternation in citations) (footnotes omitted).
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rule. Not all complaints are created equal—while
some barely satisfy the pleading requirement, others
are replete with detailed factual information of obvious relevance to the case at hand. To take but one example, the Ambac complaint . . . recounts a detailed
study by Ambac Assurance Corp. that revealed widespread breaches of representations in almost 80 percent of the documents supporting the loans it reviewed. It makes little sense to say that information
from such a study — which the TAC could unquestionably rely on if it were mentioned in a news clipping or public testimony — is immaterial simply because it is conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.
The other complaints on which the TAC relies are of a
similar character. Accordingly, the [c]ourt will not
strike references to them from the TAC. In any event,
nothing rides on how much weight the [c]ourt gives
the sections of the TAC that rely on other parties’
pleadings. Even if the Court struck every such paragraph, the TAC would still contain sufficient factual
allegations to plead claims under Sections 11 and
12(a) (2). 51
Thus, when an independent factual basis for the subject allegations can be discerned from the face of a complaint, or the allegations, generally, have some indicia of reliability, some district courts
51 In re Bears, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 768 n.24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see generally Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 97 (rejecting the argument that the judge improperly admitted into
evidence an earlier SEC civil consent decree, holding:
The decree was clearly admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to show
defendant knew SEC reporting requirements involved in the decree; the
decree’s prejudicial potential was not great, and [judge] . . . cautioned
the jury as to the limited inferences they could permissibly draw from it.
Though we have previously recognized that a consent decree and a nolo
contendere plea are somewhat analogous in that neither may be used to
prove underlying facts of liability . . . a nolo plea encounters the bar of
Fed. R. Evid. 410, while a civil consent decree, as the settlement of a
civil suit, is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 408. The latter rule bars evidence
of a compromise to prove liability for the claim, but specifically permits
use of such evidence for other purposes.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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have been inclined to permit reliance on borrowed allegations. 52 The
converse is also true. To make such determinations, however, the reviewing court will need to make highly subjective assessments of the
reliability of pleadings not before the court, based on their intuitions
about the verisimilitude of untested allegations, made by interested
pleaders, in advocacy documents.
In VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 53 plaintiff
VNB Realty, Inc. (“VNB”), a real estate investment trust, purchased
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (“RMBS”) from the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed the “genesis” of this case was a filing by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) against the defendants in connection with the purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(collectively, the “GSEs”) of certificates like those purchased by
VNB (the “FHFA action”). 54 The FHFA action was one of seventeen
actions filed by FHFA and being coordinated before Judge Cote, the
presiding judge in VNB, of which thirteen were then unresolved. 55
52 In Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),
for example, class plaintiffs relied upon an analyst report of well-known short seller, Muddy
Waters Report, and defendants moved to strike arguing it was unreliable and unsubstantiated, and thus, had no bearing on the issue in dispute citing, inter alia, Lipsky, as support for
striking “allegations of unadjudicated facts taken from a complaint in a separate proceeding.” The court held that although “defendants questioned the reliability of the anonymously
written Muddy Waters Report, an analyst’s report ‘does not implicate the same skepticism as
a ‘traditional’ anonymous source.’” Id. at 564. (citing In re China Educ. Alliance, Inc. Sec.
Litig., CV 10–9239 CAS JCX, 2011 WL 4978483 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011)). The Ho
court explained “that a ruling that [would] find[] financial analysts’ reports as suspect would
mean . . . a plaintiff would never be able to rely on an unsigned analyst’s report to support a
securities fraud allegation.” Although Defendants argued that Muddy Waters, as a short
seller of the stock being attacked, was biased, and that Muddy Waters “openly admitted the
possible inaccuracy of the Report,” the court, further stated that “the reliability of the report
is a question of fact.” Id. The Muddy Waters Report cannot, the court held, “be said to clearly ha[ve] no bearing on the issue in dispute.” Id. (citing Global View Ltd. Venture Capital v.
Great Cent. Basin Exploration, 288 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481) (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The court denied Defendants’ motion to strike the report, Lipsky notwithstanding.
53 No. 11 Civ. 6805 (DLC), 2013 WL 5179197 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013).
54 Id. at *1.
55 The VNB court summarized the facts as follows:
VNB contends that it purchased RMBS issued from a single securitization: Banc of America Alternative Loan Trust, Series 2006–1
(“BOAA 2006–1”). RMBS are securities entitling the holder to income
payments from pools of residential mortgage loans (“Supporting Loan
Groups” or “SLGs”) that are held by a trust. For the securities at issue
here, the offering process began with a “sponsor,” defendant Bank of
America, National Association (“BOA National”), which originated the
mortgage loans that were to be included in the offering. The sponsor
then transferred a portfolio of loans to a trust that was created specifical-
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Plaintiffs claimed certain Offering Documents contained materially
false and misleading statements about the loans’ characteristics and
defendants moved to strike portions of the pleading on the ground
they improperly imported passages from complaints in other cases,
relying on Lipsky, and to dismiss. 56
The court began by noting that Rule 12(f) allows a court to
strike from a pleading “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter,” and that the Second Circuit, in Lipsky, had stated
that “courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is a
strong reason for so doing,” 57 and has emphasized that Rule 12(f) is
“designed for excision of material from a pleading, not for dismissal
of claims in their entirety.” 58 Judge Cote noted that striking a portion
of a pleading is a disfavored, drastic remedy intended as a means to
avoid “expenditure of time and money litigating spurious issues by
dispensing with them prior to trial.” 59 She noted: “general judicial
agreement, . . . that motions to strike . . . should be denied unless the
challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection
to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of

ly for that securitization; this task was accomplished through the involvement of an intermediary known as a “depositor,” defendant Banc of
America Mortgage Securities, Inc. (“BOA Mortgage”). The trust then
issued certificates to the underwriter, defendant Banc of America Securities, LLC (“BOA Securities”), which in turn sold them to plaintiff VNB.
All three of these entities were wholly owned subsidiaries of defendant
Bank of America Corporation (“BOA Corp.”).
The certificates were backed by the underlying mortgages. Thus,
their value depended on the ability of mortgagors to repay the loan principal and interest and the adequacy of the collateral in the event of default. VNB purchased Class 4CB1 certificates. The certificates purchased by VNB were backed by a different Supporting Loan Group and
came from a lower tranche than the certificates purchased by the GSEs
but were nevertheless also rated AAA at the time of issuance and purchase. The certificates were offered pursuant to a shelf registration
statement, a prospectus, and a prospectus supplement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). These documents together
constitute the “Offering Documents” (or “Offering Materials”).
Id. at *1.
56 Id. at *2.
57 Id. at *2 (quoting Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893).
58 VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *2 (quoting Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811
(2d Cir. 1992)).
59 Id. (quoting Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.” 60
Defendants relied on Lipsky and certain of its progeny in support of “the proposition that references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceedings that did not result in an adjudication on the merits or legal or permissible findings of fact are, as a
matter of law, immaterial under Rule 12(f),” 61 which proposition the
court noted traced to Lipsky, which had been read with “varying degrees of breadth.” 62 Although Judge Cote would decide the case on
other grounds, she sided with the courts that did not interpret Lipsky
as articulating a bright line rule precluding citation to complaints
from other actions:
A close reading of Lipsky reveals that it does not
mandate the elimination of material from a complaint
simply because the material is copied from another
complaint. Lipsky principally addressed whether a
complaint had adequately pleaded that the offering
documents filed by the defendants in connection with
the plaintiff’s shares contained material omissions and
misrepresentations. . . . Instead of discussing its own
offering documents, the plaintiff had copied passages
from an SEC complaint with allegations about other
offering documents. . . . While the plaintiff claimed
that the sets of documents were “basically duplicates,”
its pleading had not actually alleged that its own offering documents were defective. The Court of Appeals
remanded the action to the district court to permit the
plaintiff to amend its complaint to allege inadequacies
in its own offering documents. 63
She continued:
Given this context, Lipsky’s discussion of Rule
60 Id. at *3 (citing 5C. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1382 (3d ed. 2011); U.S.
v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Gitto Global Corp., 422 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2005); Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)).
61 Id. (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, 218 F.R.D. at 78).
62 Id. (comparing RSM, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 403) (observing that “[p]aragraphs in a complaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other actions that have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved are . . . immaterial . . . .”) with In re Bear Stearns,
851 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (“[n]either Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute
rule.” (discussing RSM)).
63 VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *3.
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12(f), and in particular its examination of whether references to other pleadings should be stricken as “immaterial,” has limited utility if a plaintiff has adequately identified the material omissions and
misstatements in the offering documents relevant to
his claim. As the Lipsky court stressed, its holding
was confined to the “facts of this case.” . . . It stated,
“we hold that neither a complaint nor references to a
complaint which results in a consent judgment may
properly be cited in the pleadings under the facts of
this case.” . . . The more general teaching of Lipsky
that courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless
there is a strong reason for so doing, . . . has broader
applicability, as does its admonition that Rule 12(f)
should be construed strictly against striking portions
of the pleadings on the grounds of immateriality, and
if the motion is granted at all, the complaint should be
pruned with care. 64
Defendants argued numerous complaint paragraphs were copied verbatim, or with minimal alterations from the other complaints,
without even an explicit reference to them.
Nevertheless, Judge Cote, noting that while the plaintiffs’
counsel chose to copy the wording used by other lawyers, there is no
evidentiary rule against “plagiarism. 65 Plaintiffs referenced a forensic loan file review performed by the FHFA in another case and, in
language largely copied from the FHFA’s complaint, the pleading reported the forensic loan file review had involved taking a sample of
1,000 randomly selected loans from each Supporting Loan Group and
reviewing them to determine whether, for instance, loan to value ratios reported in the Prospectus Supplements were accurate. 66 The
court held the description of the FHFA review did not need be stricken.
The complaint cited a different complaint as the source of certain factual allegations that apparently originated with “confidential
witnesses.” The allegations contained in the sub-paragraphs were, in

64
65
66

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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turn, copied almost verbatim from five paragraphs of the different
complaint, containing allegations attributed to confidential sources.
The court described this part of the pleading as “problematic,” insofar
as it relied on confidential sources quoted in another complaint, i.e.,
individuals with whom VNB’s counsel did not have “direct contact.” 67 However, Judge Cote held “[a]ny deficiency in this regard . .
. must be tested under the standards arising under Rule 9(b), and may
not be stricken in advance of that analysis through application of
Rule 12(f).” 68
In In re OSG Sec. Litig., 69 the district court granted the class
action plaintiffs’ motion to amend their securities complaint to add
allegations derived from a motion to dismiss made in another lawsuit. 70 The defendants argued Lipsky precluded such addition, but the
court concluded that Lipsky did not hold that a complaint might never
reference allegations from a separate proceeding regardless of circumstances. 71 Distinguishing cases interpreting Lipsky as articulating
a broad, bright line rule precluding all reference to allegations to
complaints in other proceedings, the court held that Lipsky had not
gone that far:
[S]ome district courts in this Circuit have adopted the
broad rule that a complaint may never reference allegations from a separate proceeding that has not been
decided on the merits. . . (citation omitted). However,
no Second Circuit precedent indicates such a broad
rule. In 1976, in Lipsky v. Commonwealth United
Corporation, the Second Circuit held that “neither a
complaint nor references to a complaint which results
in a consent judgment may properly be cited in the
pleadings under the facts of this case” (citation omitted). However, Lipsky relied on the fact that Federal
Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 410 “prohibits a plea of nolo contendere from being later used against the party
who so pleaded,” and noted that “nolo pleas have been
equated with consent decrees” for purposes of the pro67
68
69
70
71

Id.
VNB Realty, Inc., 2013 WL 5179197, at *4.
12 F. Supp. 3d 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 620.
Id.
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vision at issue . . . (citation omitted). Because the
consent decree could not be used as evidence in a subsequent lawsuit, the court reasoned that the complaint
from that action was also immaterial under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) (citation omitted). 72
Lipsky, the court explained, emphasized the general rule that
motions to strike pleadings as immaterial should be denied unless it
can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be
admissible. However, the court further stated that it did not hold that
complaints may never reference allegations from a separate proceeding, under any circumstances.Rather, Lipsky’s holding was limited to
complaints that ultimately resulted in a consent decree or nolo contendere plea, protected by FRE 410. 73
The court continued:
The Second Circuit later [post-Lipsky] clarified in
United States v. Gilbert that civil settlements and consent decrees are governed by FRE 410, not FRE 408 . .
. (note omitted). While settlements are inadmissible as
evidence of liability, they are admissible for other
purposes, including proof of knowledge . . . (note
omitted). It follows that reference to the complaints or
allegations in such actions would be permissible for
the same reasons. Thus, it would make little sense to
strike references to pleadings in ongoing actions,
which do not trigger the protections or policy concerns
of FRE 410 or FRE 408 . . . (note omitted). 74
72 Id. at 620-21 (citing as examples, Id. at n.3, In re CRM Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No.
10 Civ. 975, 2012 WL 1646888 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2012) (plaintiffs’ citation to unproven
allegations made in other complaints do not constitute factual allegations and must be stricken); Low v. Robb, No. 11 Civ. 2321, 2012 WL 173472 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2012) (It is well
settled that allegations in a complaint that are either based on, or rely on, complaints in other
actions that have been dismissed, settled, or otherwise not resolved, are, as a matter of law,
immaterial within the meaning of Rule 12(f)); RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d
382, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (striking references to complaints filed in other actions that had
not been resolved on the merits), aff’d on other grds, 387 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2010); In re
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Secs. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (
“references to preliminary steps in litigations and administrative proceedings that did not
result in an adjudication on the merits or legal or permissible findings of fact are, as a matter
of law, immaterial . . . .”).
73 In re OSG Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
74 Id.
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At note 8 of the decision, the court explained that Lipsky had
itself noted—in dicta—that a consent decree could not be used as evidence in subsequent litigation because it was not the result of an actual adjudication of any of the issues, and that many district courts interpreted this dicta to preclude any reference to an action or
complaint not decided on the merits. Noting that several district
courts recognized Lipsky’s “limited holding” and the “illogic of a
bright line rule” against citing allegations from other proceedings, 75
the court held:
While allegations from another lawsuit are not evidence and cannot be “introduced in a later trial for collateral estoppel purposes” (citation omitted) plaintiffs
need not provide admissible proof at this stage. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery on
relevant matters that appear “reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (citation
omitted). Similarly, plaintiffs may plead facts contained in the Proskauer motion upon information and
belief, and find admissible evidence to support those
allegations at a later stage. “ (citation omitted). Even
allegations of fraud can be made upon information and
belief where the matters alleged are “peculiarly within
the opposing party’s knowledge” (citation omitted) as
75

Id. at n.8. The court cited as examples VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11
Civ. 6805, 2013 WL 5179197 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (declining to strike portions of a
complaint citing a complaint in another ongoing action, and noting that whether the allegations met plaintiffs’ pleading burden was a separate question); In re Bear Stearns Mortg.
Pass–Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 768 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“some
courts in this district have stretched the holding in Lipsky to mean that any portion of a
pleading that relies on unadjudicated allegations in another complaint is immaterial under
Rule 12(f) . . . . Neither Circuit precedent nor logic supports such an absolute rule.”); Johnson v. M & M Commc’ns, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 187, 189 (D. Conn. 2007) (allowing allegations
from another lawsuit to remain in the complaint and noting that “whether evidence of the
prior investigations will be admissible at trial is an issue to be resolved at a later stage of the
litigation”). See generally Baron v. Miller, 2014 WL 3956562, at 12-13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13
2014) (Scullin, J.) (adopting magistrate report, Peebles, J., which recommended that that although paragraphs from a complaint might ultimately be found to be immaterial to the cause
of action asserted in the instant pleading, they were not “so impertinent” as to justify striking
them, given the liberal pleading standard applicable to the motion under consideration, recommending denial of motion to strike). See also HSN Nordbank AG v. RBS Holdings USA
Inc., 2015 WL 1307189 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. March 23, 2015) (Gardephe, J.) (some courts, e.g.,
RSM, have “stretched” the holding of Lipsky, and following, instead, the Bear Stearns approach, allowing reliance on study “conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.”).
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long as plaintiffs “provide a statement of facts upon
which the belief is founded.” (Citation omitted). 76
III.

THE RULE 11 APPROACH

Recently, rather than relying on an interpretation of Lipsky to
resolve whether reliance on another litigant’s pleadings is permitted,
some judges have looked to Rule 11 for the analysis.
A.

Rule 11 – What is a Proper Investigation?

In both 1983 and 1993, FRCP 11 was amended with respect
to the necessary level of pre-filing inquiry into alleged facts. FRCP
11(b)(3) currently requires the filer to certify “that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances. . . the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 77 The Advisory Committee Notes to the ‘93
amendments reiterate that the filer must conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the facts and does not have license to make claims without any
factual basis. As the Supreme Court has made clear:
[T]he purpose of Rule 11 as a whole is to bring home
to the individual signer his personal, nondelegable responsibility. It is at least arguable that these purposes
are better served by a provision which makes clear
that, just as the court expects the signer personally-and
not some nameless person within his law firm-to validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers
filed, so also it will visit upon him personally-and not
his law firm-its retribution for failing in that responsibility. The message thereby conveyed to the attorney,
that this is not a “team effort” but in the last analysis
76 2014 WL 504078, at *2. Some courts noting conflicting decisions have refused to
“wade into the debate.” See, e.g., Moses v. Apple Hospitality Reit Inc., 2015 WL 1014327,
at 2 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 2015) (referencing Lipsky, and competing interpretations in Merrill
Lynch, VBN and Bear Stearns and stating issues would be resolved on other grounds). See
also UPS Store, Inc. v. Hagan, 2015 WL 1456654, at 11 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 2015) (discussing Lipsky and VBN).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
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yours alone, is precisely the point of Rule 11. Moreover, psychological effect aside, there will be greater
economic deterrence upon the signing attorney, who
will know for certain that the district court will impose
its sanction entirely upon him, and not divert part of it
to a partnership of which he may not (if he is only an
associate) be a member, or which (if he is a member)
may not choose to seek recompense from him. 78
In In re Lehman Bros. Sec. and Erisa Litig., 79 “[d]efendants
argued [plaintiff] could not rely on confidential witnesses cited in another complaint to meet its pleading burden. [Noting that] the Second Circuit had not ruled on the exact issue, [the court observed]
many district courts had held allegations relying on allegations drawn
from other complaints is improper,” 80 but that at least one court had
held it was “appropriate for a plaintiff, at the pleading stage, to rely
on confidential witness statements, as recounted in other complaints.” 81 The court held “it would be inappropriate to give any
weight to the alleged confidential witness statements” because there
was “no suggestion counsel had spoken with these confidential witnesses or even knows who they are.” 82 When citing alleged confidential witnesses in a complaint, the court held, a Rule 11 “certification means that counsel has spoken with these confidential witnesses
and knows who they are.” 83
Allowing counsel to rely on confidential witness statements
recounted in a different complaint would, the court held, provide little
assurance that factual contentions have evidentiary support. 84 The
court observed that while plaintiffs may rely in their complaints on
witness statements recounted in newspaper articles and government
reports, their probative value is “much greater than that of confiden78 Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126-27, 110 S.Ct. 456, 459-60
(1989).
79 2013 WL 3989066 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Kaplan, J.).
80 Id. at *4 (citing RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman, 643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 403 (S.D.N.Y.2009)
(citing Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 892–94 (2d Cir.1976)).
81 Id. at *4 (citing 380544 Canada, Inc. v. Aspen Tech., Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 199, 224–25
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although the confidential informants are not personally known to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs’ counsel, the fact that the informants’ accounts are derived from an earlier
pleading in a different case simply does not render the instant pleading inadequate.”)
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 2013 WL 3989066, at *4.
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tial witness statements, recounted in . . .[complaints].” 85 The court
observed that “[t]here is significant motive and opportunity for counsel in any case to misuse or mischaracterize confidential witness
statements in a[n advocacy] pleading.” 86 Also, courts have the ability
to remedy abuses through sanctions, but sanctions are often ineffective because misconduct will normally come to light, if ever, only
during or after discovery, when damage is already done. 87 As such,
“[t]he unfairness of permitting a plaintiff in a separate action to rely
blindly at the pleading stage primarily on confidential witness statements from another case to meet its pleading burden is patent.” 88
In Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Sand Canyon Corp., 89 the
court noted that “[t]he Second Circuit ha[d] not yet ruled on whether
plaintiffs can rely on confidential witnesses cited in another complaint to meet their pleading burden[,]” 90 and that while several
courts had permitted “utiliz[ation] of allegations drawn from other
complaints[,]” 91 others had rejected such use. 92 The court noted it is
not a plaintiff’s burden “to show it is permissible for it to quote accounts of confidential sources from a separate proceeding [, but] rather . . . [d]efendant’s burden to show . . . [p]laintiff may not do so. 93
Defendant argued that Rule 11 “prohibits the use of confidential witness statements from a different complaint because . . . it requires
counsel to certify that he has [personally] spoken with the confidential witnesses and knows who they are.” 94 The court rejected that interpretation, holding:
Rule 11 only requires counsel to certify “that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir85 Id.; see generally Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc.,887 F. Supp. 2d 547, 56364(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (distinguishing citation of news reports and confidential sources).
86 2013 WL 3989066, at *4.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 298 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
90 Id. at 125. (citing Lehman Bros., 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (“the Second Circuit does
not appear to have ruled on this exact issue”)).
91 Id. at 126 (citing In re Bear Stearns Mortgage Pass–Through Certificates Litig., 851 F.
Supp. 2d 746, 768 n. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 380544 Canada, Inc. v. Aspen Tech., Inc., 544 F.
Supp. 2d 199, 224–25 (S.D.N.Y.2008)).
92 Id. at 126 (citing VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 6805, 2013 WL
5179197, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013); Lehman Bros., 2013 WL 3989066, at *4).
93 Id. at 126 (quoting 380544 Canada, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d at 224).
94 Homeward Residential, 298 F.R.D. at 126.
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cumstances . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 95
The court held Rule 11 “allow[s] incorporation of allegations
from other complaints if . . . combined with material the plaintiff has
investigated personally . . . lend[s] credence to the borrowed allegations.” 96 The complaint before the court stated that the confidential
witness statements were included “on information and belief in their
truth and on reasonable belief that further inquiry and discovery from
[D]efendant and others will provide evidence of [their] truth” and that
the confidential witness statements were supported by allegations of
bad appraisals in the loans at issue. 97 The court noted that the statements contained their own “indicia of reliability,” because the quotes
were from different employees rather than from, for example, one
possibly disgruntled or vindictive employee, and also that witnesses
worked in different geographic areas and in different positions
throughout the company. 98 Because the witnesses reported a consistent pattern of behavior, the court had more “faith in their accuracy” and, citing Bear Stearns, held the allegations of appraisal fraud in
the complaint satisfied Rule 9(b). 99
Essentially, the court found that because the alleged confidential witness statements, although borrowed from a different complaint, were openly pled on information and belief, contained their
own indicia of reliability, and were buttressed by independent allegations of bad loan appraisals, their incorporation into the complaint
was permissible. 100 Other courts, relying on Rule 11, however, have
taken a different view. In Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 101for example, the court explained why citation to the factual content of other
95

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)).
Id. (citing In re Connetics Corp. Secs. Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“attorney may rely in part on other sources as part of his or her [factual] investigation”); In re Cylink Secs. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (N.D.Cal.2001) (complaint may
combine plaintiff’s own allegations with SEC complaint allegations)).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Homeward Residential, 298 F.R.D. at 126 (citing Bear Stearns, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 76768.) (proposing complaints replete with detailed factual information are better for borrowing
than others).
100 Id.
101 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).
96
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complaints violates Rule 11:
[The attorneys] abdicated their own responsibilities
and relied excessively on Malone contrary to Rule 11 .
. .they did not rely on Malone only as to some small
portion of the case. Rather, they relied on his inquiry
to justify the entire cause of action. Indeed, they filed
the complaint Malone had prepared, changing only the
name of the plaintiffs and the number of shares owned
. . . . Rule 11 requires that an attorney signing a pleading must make a reasonable inquiry personally. The
advantage of duplicate personal inquiries is manifest:
while one attorney might find a complaint well founded in fact and warranted by the law, another, even after examining the materials available to the first attorney, could come to a contrary conclusion. 102
Thus, some rulings focus on the nature of the borrowed allegation and whether sufficient ground exists for concluding that the
filer has sufficient corroborative knowledge to support the allegation.
“Filing a complaint in federal court is no trifling undertaking. An attorney’s signature on a complaint is tantamount to a warranty that the
complaint is well grounded in fact . . . .” 103 Rule 11(b) states that by
presenting a pleading to the Court, an attorney “certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” 104 Attorneys have a duty, prior to
filing a complaint, to conduct a “reasonable” factual investigation but
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only plead facts, not produce
admissible evidence. 105
In In re Connetics Corp. Sec. Litig., 106 the court explained in
some detail what types of sources could be relied upon and the reasons why such reliance would be permissible:

102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 1280.
Christian v. Mattel, 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
See In re McKesson HBOC Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
542 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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When drafting a complaint, an attorney may rely in
part on other sources, such as a newspaper article . . .
as part of his or her investigation into the facts, but
plaintiffs cite no authority that stands for the proposition that an attorney may rely entirely on another
complaint as the sole basis for his or her allegations . .
. . Here, as to the particular paragraphs that defendants ask the Court to strike, there apparently were no
“investigative efforts” to combine with plaintiffs’ reliance on the SEC complaint. Although plaintiffs contend that the SEC complaint is one of many bases for
plaintiffs’ complaint, they do not contend that they
conducted independent investigation into the facts alleged in the SEC complaint or had any additional bases for the specific allegations pertaining to [defendants] . . . . Instead, the SEC complaint appears to be
the only basis for the allegations . . . . 107
Because, under Rule 11(b), an attorney has a “nondelegable
responsibility” to “personally . . . validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers filed,” 108 and “to conduct a reasonable factual
investigation,” 109 the court held that it would make little sense that an
attorney “somehow can rely on the analysis of attorneys in different
actions and who are presumably from different law firms.” 110 The
107

Id. at 1005. The court distinguished several cases plaintiffs argued supported their argument that they could properly incorporate the allegations of the SEC complaint into their
own complaint. In re Cylink Sec. Litig. was “inapposite because the question there was
whether a complaint filed by the SEC may come into the mix of materials considered . . . on
a motion to dismiss,” not whether incorporation of complaint allegations that relied entirely
on an SEC complaint was permissible, under Rule 11-- “[T]hese allegations, especially when
combined with the other transactions detailed in the SEC complaint, provide strong circumstantial evidence . . . .” (emphasis added). 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 80-83 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In
De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomm., Inc., the court considered Rule 11 but noted that the plaintiff had stated “that every allegation in the complaint was verified by plaintiff’s counsel
through independent investigation.” 259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court
held that In re McKesson actually supported defendants’ arguments -- “[t]o the extent that a
newspaper article corroborates plaintiff’s own investigation and provides detailed factual
allegations, it can— at least in combination with plaintiff’s investigative efforts—be a reasonable source of information and belief allegations.” (emphasis added). 126 F. Supp. 2d
1248, 1272 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
108 Id. (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)).
109 Id. (quoting Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)).
110 Id. (quoting Geinko v. Padda, 2002 WL 276236, *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2002)); see also
VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of America Corp., 2013 WL 5179197, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,
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plaintiffs, however, had failed to inform the court as to what other
sources of information besides the SEC complaint and press release
they relied on in formulating their specific claims against the defendants. The complaint, as well, failed to indicate any other sources
were used to formulate the claims in issue. “The Court agree[d] with
defendants that, under Rule 11(b), plaintiffs did not personally investigate their claims against defendants.” 111 It struck each paragraph
for which the SEC complaint was the sole source of factual support
as well as all paragraphs containing facts taken directly from the SEC
complaint, without further investigation. 112
B.

Implications of the PSLRA on Securities Fraud
Pleadings

For securities fraud claims, additional considerations are
raised by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”) 113—enacted in 1995 to deter securities fraud strike suits.
The PSLRA brought with it a higher pleading standard for securities
fraud claims as it relates to misrepresentations and omissions and the
elements of scienter and loss causation (and a stay of all discovery

2013) (“By drawing its factual allegations from the statements of confidential witnesses in
AIG’s complaint, VNB is attempting to rely on the substance of those allegations without
being held responsible for certifying that they are supported by some factual basis, or at least
that the witnesses did in fact make such statements. Unlike AIG, VNB presumably does not
even know who these witnesses are. See Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 6637(LAK), 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013). Such
reliance is impermissible, particularly in light of counsel’s “personal, non-delegable responsibility” under Rule 11 to “validate the truth and legal reasonableness of the papers filed.”
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989); see also
Stichting, 2013 WL 3989066, at *4 (“Allowing counsel to rely on confidential witness
statements recounted in a separate complaint would provide the Court little assurance that
the factual contentions have any evidentiary support.”)”. Judge Cote further observed that
by “allowing parties to rely on confidential witness statements drawn from another complaint, the potential existed to incentivize collusion and raises the possibility of complaints
that are stocked with fabricated confidential witness statements placed in other complaints.”). VBN, 2013 WL 5179197, at n. 6.
111 In re Connectics, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005-06; see generally VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank
of America Corp., 2013 WL 5179197, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Rule 11 concerns . . . are
heightened here, where VNB has stripped from the FAC any mention of the AIG complaint,
while preserving the attribution of the statements to confidential witnesses. This creates the
apparently erroneous impression that counsel for VNB has actually spoken with these witnesses and can affirm that they did in fact make the statements attributed to them.”).
112 In re Connectics, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1006.
113 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4 (2012).
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pending a motion to dismiss). 114 It requires one who pleads misrepresentations and omissions on the basis of information and belief to
“state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” 115
In Faulkner v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 116plaintiffs
sought to lift a PSLRA discovery stay so they could uncover “facts”
to support their fraud allegations. 117 The district court held the sufficiency of the complaint had to be determined prior to lifting the stay
because the discovery stay contemplates “discovery should be permitted in securities class actions only after the court has sustained the
legal sufficiency of the complaint.” 118 The PSLRA requires the trial
court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to satisfy the Act’s heightened pleading standards. 119 As a matter of law, failure to muster facts
sufficient to meet the Act’s pleading requirements does not constitute
the requisite “undue prejudice” to the plaintiff justifying a lift of discovery stay under § 78u–4(b)(3)(B). To hold otherwise would contravene the purpose of the Act’s heightened pleading standards. 120
While the PSLRA expressly requires that sources of information and belief be alleged, the underpinning of this requirement
applies equally to a non-PSLRA complaint. 121 Such disclosure ena114

15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)-(3)(B) (2012). The PSLRA has been interpreted to require
the pleader to “muster facts” sufficient to meet its heightened pleading standards without the
aid of discovery. See Faulkner v. Verizon Comm., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). To hold otherwise would contravene the very purpose of those standards. Id. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) also imposes a heightened pleading standard for alleging fraud, which is applicable to securities fraud claims.
115 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012).
116 156 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
117 Id. at 402.
118 See id. at 402-03 (quoting S.Rep. No. 104–98, 1, 14 (1995)).
119 See 15 U.S.C.A § 78u–4(b)(3)(A) (2010).
120 Id. at (b)(3)(B); see also Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal.,
99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “Congress clearly intended that complaints in
these securities actions should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the plaintiffs
rather than information produced by defendants after the action has been filed.”); see also In
re Carnegie Int’l Corp. Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that the
stay also precludes defendants from acquiring documents from a third party).
121 See ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2009).
Holding:
The express congressional purpose of the PSLRA provision was to increase the frequency of Rule 11 sanctions in the securities context, and
thus tilt the “balance” toward greater deterrence of frivolous securities
claims. “Recognizing what it termed ‘the need to reduce significantly
the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of
victims of fraud to pursue legitimate claims,’ and commenting that the
‘[e]xisting Rule 11 has not deterred abusive securities litigation,’ the
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bles the district court to evaluate the sufficiency of the alleged belief,
by considering the adequacy and reliability of the sources upon which
the complaint relies. 122
While VNB Realty v. Bank of Am. Corp. 123 did not involve the
PSLRA, the decision does identify some of the pleading concerns
raised by relying on another’s complaint.
C.

What kind of “information” and what kind of
“belief” is really at issue?

Clearly, a filer may make allegations based upon information
and belief. 124 When the filer properly discloses that he has relied on
another complaint, it becomes incumbent on the district court to
evaluate the sufficiency and reliability of that complaint as the filer’s
source.
In In re Optionable Sec. Litig., 125 the plaintiffs relied on
newspaper articles, which purported to describe a report compiled by
Deloitte and Touche, LLP, as forensic auditor. The court began its
analysis by explaining that: “‘[N]ewspaper articles should be credited
only to the extent that other factual allegations would be - if they are
104th Congress included in the [PSLRA] a measure intended to put
‘teeth’ in Rule 11.” Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs
Group, Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1999). By virtue of this statutory notice, consideration of sanctions in the PSLRA context can never
be sua sponte and can never come as a surprise, because Congress, not
the court, has prompted and mandated a Rule 11 finding.
Id.
122 See generally De la Fuente v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 250,
260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Holding:
There is nothing improper about utilizing information from the SEC as
evidence to support private claims. Indeed, as plaintiff notes “it would
have been irresponsible for plaintiff to have ignored the SEC’s highly
relevant allegations and findings.” (Plaintiff’s Opp., p. 4.) The striking
similarity between the SEC’s allegations and plaintiff’s allegations does
not demonstrate that plaintiff lacked evidentiary support. Rather, the
SEC allegations provided plaintiff with evidentiary support. The
PSLRA does not require that a plaintiff re-invent the wheel before filing
a complaint; and one could argue that a complaint predicated on the results of an SEC investigation has far more “evidentiary support” than
one based on rumor and innuendo gleaned from “Heard on the Street.”
Id.
123 2003 WL 51791971, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2003).
124 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
125 577 F. Supp. 2d 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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sufficiently particular and detailed to indicate their reliability. Conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are no more sufficient if they come
from a newspaper article than from plaintiff’s counsel.’” 126 The first
article described the source of the Deloitte report as “a source familiar with the report” and the second failed to identify a basis for its description. 127 The plaintiffs, nevertheless, argued the articles were sufficient sources to base their information pleading, because
newspapers are credible and the reporters are diligent. 128
The court noted that the articles provided no basis for believing that the unidentified source was likely to have known the relevant
facts about the Deloitte report. 129 Additionally, the article allegations
lacked specificity. 130 Nevertheless, the court held, for motion purposes, that it would assume the plaintiffs identified an adequate
source for their claim that Optionable provided some inaccurate prices. 131 The court stated that the articles supported that “limited allegation,” but not the proposition that plaintiff’s losses were attributable
to Optionable’s alleged mispricing or intentional provision of inaccurate prices. 132 Plaintiffs had also alleged someone received payments
from Optionable based on statements of a confidential witness (an alleged analyst who followed Optionable during the relevant time period). 133 Although plaintiffs had identified their source, the court held
this was insufficient - in addition to identifying the source, the source
must be affirmatively shown to be likely to know the relevant
facts, 134 and, in the case before the court, there was no reason to believe the “analyst” was likely to have known such facts. 135 As the
court stated, “[a]llegations based on the investigation of counsel are
126 Id. at 690 (quoting In re Wet Seal, Inc. Sec. Litig., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1172 (C.D.
Cal. 2007)).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 691.
134 See Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (S.D.N.Y.2004));
Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
135 Optionable, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 690. (The allegation, moreover, lacked detail that
might have suggested this analyst had personal knowledge, as it did not describe the time,
amount, or method of payment, but simply argued their claim was based on plaintiff’s investigation).
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deemed to be made on ‘information and belief’” 136 and “the phrase
‘investigation of counsel’ is meaningless . . . . ‘[N]o amount of investigation can transform information and belief-hearsay, essentially
into personal knowledge.’” 137
Sometimes, reliance on another complaint, coupled with other
reliable sources, has been found to be adequate. For example, in Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC,138 the district
court permitted reliance on an SEC complaint, which resulted in a
consent judgment, when coupled with statements to investors and a
court-liquidator’s report. The court explained:
Where allegations are made on information and
belief, two separate inquiries are required to determine
whether plaintiffs have pleaded with particularity facts
sufficient to support their beliefs. First, plaintiffs’ factual allegations must be based on adequate sources.
Plaintiffs must identify sufficiently the sources upon
which their beliefs are based and those sources must
have been likely to have known the relevant facts.
Second, the underlying factual allegations must justify
the inference that plaintiffs urge. In other words,
plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to justify the assertion that the NAVs were inflated and that the
amount of the inflation would have been material to a
reasonable investor. 139
Generally, the stronger the factual basis for the filer’s belief,
that is, the more corroborating sources and the more reliable those
sources are, the more inclined some district courts may be to sustain
the allegation. If a pleading clearly demonstrates that a filer abdicated his responsibility to conduct a reasonable inquiry and investigation, it cannot be relied upon by a different pleading, whether viewed
136 See id. at 691 (citing Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 136 (D. Conn.
2007)).
137 See id. (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
138 376 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
139 Id. at 395 (notes omitted) (“Here, the subsidiary factual allegations that plaintiffs rely
upon are based upon the Liquidator’s Report . . . statements made by Beacon Hill to investors, and the SEC Complaint. These are adequate for Rule 9(b) and PSLRA purposes. The
question therefore is whether the factual allegations drawn from these sources support the
conclusion that the NAVs were materially false and misleading.”).
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from the perspective of Lipksy or Rule 11. But absent such clear
demonstration, if there is some indicia of reliability as to the sources
relied upon, and some plausibility to the claims, the plausibility approach could result in a court sustaining the second complaint or its
content.
CONCLUSION
The question whether the content of pleadings from other cases may be properly inserted into one’s own pleading has no easy answer. As demonstrated above, courts are not only reading Lipsky in
different ways, but looking to other authorities to provide guidance
for their decisions, including Rule 11 analyses and “plausibility” approaches. The different approaches have their own benefits and disadvantages, as summarized below.
The absolute interpretation of Lipsky as a bright line test is
easy to apply, and its application will likely reduce judicial time and
litigation costs. It does so by eliminating the need for judges to enter
into detailed (likely intuitive) determinations as to the “factual credibility” of the content of pleadings not before the court. On the other
hand, there may be factual allegations in the pleadings of other cases
which present indicia of plausibility that suggest their content could
be reliable and viewed as “some evidence” of the underlying facts.
The not-so-bright line interpretation cases largely rely on an
interpretation of the evidentiary rules the Lipsky Court cited, bolstered by the Lipsky Court’s statement that pleadings should not be
tampered with absent a good reason for so doing. Untested foreign
pleadings are, at least in principle, made in compliance with Rule 11.
Therefore, they seem to be more reliable than just naked assertions.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how a reviewing court’s views as to the
reliability of a foreign pleading could not be substantially subjective—of the “I know it when I see it” type. Consideration of such allegations also portend the possibility of conflicting outcomes, for example, where the case from which the allegations derive is still being
litigated. With no practical way to monitor the correctness of a foreign pleading or assess that pleader’s good faith in interposing those
allegations, the current pleader is effectively given a “free pass” on
his own pleading, which is inconsistent with and impermissible under
Rule 11.
The Rule 11 approach avoids Lipsky interpretation fights, a
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definite advantage, but it raises its own questions. To conduct a Rule
11 “reasonable investigation,” an attorney must review documents
reasonably expected to contain information material to his or her
case. Pleadings, however, are advocacy documents and exaggerations or falsehoods frequently find their way into them, Rule 11 notwithstanding. Allowing a pleader to take the content of a complaint
from another case that he happens to review is not equivalent to a
personal, good faith basis for alleging the facts upon which the pleading supervenes. Even if one assumes the initial pleader’s certification
under Rule 11 was in good faith, this is not equivalent to the current
pleader’s own Rule 11 certification of a personal, good faith belief in
a fact interposed.
The “plausibility approach,” too, has advantages and disadvantages. There is substantial case law and commentary on how the
“plausibility” concept is applied in current motion practice. Basically, the question is whether the particular wrongdoing that the plaintiff
alleges caused the loss in issue is at least as likely an explanation for
the loss as the reason(s) the defense musters to support its argument
for dismissal. If plaintiff’s explanation in favor of liability is at least
as likely as defendant’s explanation, the complaint survives. Courts,
however, in the present context, should not be making such subjective judgments about sentences authored by lawyers not before the
court in pleadings not before the court, in cases not before the court.
On balance, the absolute interpretation approach remains the
best approach available notwithstanding that courts adopting other
approaches have arguments in their favor. The over-all problem is
that each of the other approaches cannot help but involve the court in
making what are likely to be highly intuitive assessments of foreign
pleadings, the truth of which cannot be determined by the motion
court, on a Rule 12 motion. Efforts to make such assessments would,
of necessity, disregard the undeniable reality that bias and exaggeration is often present in many pleadings, Rule 11 certifications notwithstanding.
Such subjective/intuitive approaches would, moreover, be
particularly problematic in securities litigation. Under the PSLRA,
securities plaintiffs are required to plead their cases on a prediscovery basis. Discovery is stayed unless and until the complaint
survives dismissal. Allowing pleaders to interpose allegations from
other cases – including potentially SEC complaints—would allow
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plaintiffs to effectively circumvent the PSLRA, particularly where,
based on happenstance, the SEC happens to file a complaint with
perceived helpful allegations/content to plaintiff.
The absolute interpretation of Lipsky protects litigants from a
reliance on documents from other cases whose merits have not been
proved. It protects trial courts, which should not be engaged in making intuitive assessments of the factual content or the likely merit of
the content of sentences in advocacy documents, drafted by interested
parties not before the court, which portend inconsistent results among
courts potentially addressing the same factual complexes. In light of
the different approaches courts are currently taking, it is likely a Second Circuit decision will be needed to clarify Lipsky and to determine
if (or under what circumstances) pleaders in one case may properly
allege the content of complaints crafted by other pleaders in other
cases.
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